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We examine the incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose otherwise private information about the
quality attributes of their products. In particular, we focus on the case of differentiated products with
multiple attributes and heterogeneous consumers. We show that there exist certain configurations of
consumers’ multi-dimensional preferences under which a firm, no matter whether producing a high-
or low-quality product, may choose not to reveal the quality even with zero disclosure costs. The failure
of information unraveling arises when providing consumers with more information results in more
elastic demand, which triggers more intensive price competition and leads to lower prices and profits
for competing firms. As a result, the equilibrium in which disclosure is voluntary may diverge from
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1.  Introduction 
As technological innovation constantly expands the dimensionality of the attribute space of products, the 
lack of information that consumers have about product quality has become of increasing concern for 
modern economies. However, one strand of the economics literature, initiated independently by 
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), suggests that this concern is misplaced. Both authors argue that 
strong incentives exist in markets for privately-informed firms voluntarily to disclose the quality of their 
products as long as there exists a verifiable disclosure mechanism with negligible costs. In equilibrium, 
firms’ private information about the quality of their products would “unravel” and, as a result, a manda-
tory disclosure requirement would be redundant.
1 In their models, there is little scope for firms to act stra-
tegically with respect to their disclosure decisions. In essence, high-quality firms, by distinguishing them-
selves from their lower-quality rivals, would always gain from revealing the true quality of their products, 
allowing them to charge consumers higher prices that reflect differences in quality. Only those with the 
lowest quality would choose not to reveal the quality of their products. However, their non-disclosure 
ends up being completely revealing as consumers correctly infer that a firm’s failure of disclosure is al-
ways associated with the lowest-quality products. 
  If the above results hold, there are several phenomena that are somewhat difficult to explain. The 
first concerns the findings in a number of studies showing that consumers do respond to the imposition of 
mandatory disclosure requirements. For example, Jin and Leslie (2003) find that sales of restaurants be-
came more sensitive to restaurants’ hygiene quality after restaurants were required to post “grade cards” 
about their hygiene quality in Los Angeles County in the late 1990s. They further find that as a result of 
these grade cards the incidence of hospitalizations due to food-borne illnesses declined significantly. 
Similarly, Mathios (2000) finds that salad dressings with high fat content experienced large reductions in 
                                                      
1 The logic of their result is as follows. If no firm discloses its product quality, consumers will be unable to distin-
guish between the highest-quality product and the lower-quality ones. Firms producing products with the highest 
quality will want to disclose their quality, because they will then be able to charge a higher price and achieve higher 
profits. Firms with the next highest quality product have the same incentive to distinguish themselves from the re-
maining firms. This process continues, so long as the benefits of disclosure outweigh the costs. In the limit when   2 
sales after the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act mandated all food products to carry standardized 
labels with information on a product’s nutritional content. 
  Second, there is evidence that firms in some industries actively oppose the imposition of laws and 
regulations that require mandatory disclosure. For example, lobbying by the National Automobile Dealers 
Association in 1976 led to the abolishment of the Federal Trade Commission’s mandatory inspection and 
disclosure rules on used-car dealers. In 1998, the National Restaurant Association strongly opposed the 
imposition of a requirement that all restaurants in Los Angeles County publicly display “grade cards” that 
revealed each restaurant’s hygiene practices.
2 Finally, the National Hospital Association opposed a pro-
posal in 2000 by the Clinton administration to impose mandatory reporting on hospitals of all fatal and 
other serious medical errors.
3 If it is in the self-interest of firms—unless the firm produces the worst qual-
ity—to voluntarily reveal the quality of their products, why would they, or their industry representatives, 
expend resources to avoid mandatory disclosure requirements? 
  In this paper, we consider the robustness of the Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) unraveling 
result. We consider the decisions of firms to voluntarily provide information about the quality of their 
products that would otherwise be unobserved by consumers. We assume that firms have access to a 
mechanism with which they can credibly disclose such information at zero cost. There are two features 
that distinguish our model from previous work. First, we allow products to have multiple attributes. Sec-
ond, we assume that there is heterogeneity across consumers in their preferences over these attributes. 
Following the literatures on product differentiation and hedonic pricing, we consider a model in which 
products are both horizontally and vertically differentiated, where quality is the vertical attribute. We 
show that a firm producing a high-quality product may actually benefit, rather than lose, from consumers’ 
                                                                                                                                                                           
disclosure costs are zero, the situation in which firms withhold private information about product quality “unravels.” 
2 See Food Council News, Vol. 5, Issue 1, January 2002. The National Restaurant Association stated that the “rating 
initiatives reduce complex issues to a score or letter based on subjective decisions by individual inspectors.” The in-
dustry maintained that if an establishment is good enough to pass a hygiene inspection, having to post ratings would 
constitute overkill. 
3 See CNN News, February 22, 2000. “A culture of silence” in the medical profession can be traced back to 1930s, 
when physicians were advised to “keep a cautious tongue” regarding medical errors (Gallagher et al., 2002).   3 
ignorance about product quality. This can arise if, as a result of revealing it to be the seller of a high-
quality product, its competitor’s products become more substitutable and consumers’ demands become 
more elastic. Whether the demand for these products become more elastic depends on the distribution of 
consumers’ preferences over both the horizontal and vertical attributes of products. If demand does be-
comes more elastic, disclosure will lead to more intense price competition between rival firms, causing 
prices and profits to fall for all firms. Alternatively, if this firm produces a low-quality product and re-
veals the fact to consumers, it also can suffer from lower profits as some consumers opt out of the market. 
Thus, this firm, regardless of whether it produces a high- or low-quality product, can find it in its interest 
to not disclose the quality of its product. 
  We note that there is a substantial literature that considers variants of the Grossman and Milgrom 
models. Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) derive sufficient conditions for complete revelation of all private 
information in equilibrium in a fairly general model. Researchers also have investigated certain types of 
disclosure costs (Jovanovic, 1982; Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986), costs of information acquisition by sell-
ers (Matthews and Postlewaite, 1985; Farrell, 1986; Shavell, 1994), consumers’ limited understanding of 
sellers’ disclosure (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003), consumers’ uncertainty of the existence of information 
(Dye and Sridhar 1995; Stivers, 2004), and alternative market structures (Cheong and Kim, 2004; Board, 
2009; Levin, Peck, and Ye, 2009). In these extensions, the failure to obtain voluntary disclosure from 
sellers hinges on some form of “costs” associated with disclosure.
4 The basic conclusion that complete 
voluntary disclosure will occur in equilibrium continues to hold as long as these disclosure costs are zero. 
Furthermore, in the absence of such costs, these models lead to a rather strong conclusion, namely, that 
regulatory policies that mandate product quality disclosure are, at best, redundant. As a result, the only 
potential form of government intervention that would benefit consumers would be in the form of provid-
ing low-cost and credible mechanisms for the disclosure of the quality of products.
5 In contrast to the pre-
                                                      
4 Exceptions are Fishman and Hagerty (2003) and Board (2009). 
5 This claim hinges on maintaining the assumption that firms are perfectly informed about the quality of their own 
and their competitors’ products. Firms, themselves, may benefit from mandatory information disclosure requirement 
to the extent that they are not perfectly informed.   4 
vious literature, we establish a set of conditions under which an equilibrium may exist in which firms do 
not have an incentive voluntarily to disclose the quality of their product and there may be a benefit to 
consumers of governments mandating product quality disclosure even if disclosure costs are zero. 
  Our results are closely related to the literature on firms’ decisions about whether to differentiate 
their products from those of rivals. The literature on product differentiation notes the inherent tension be-
tween the benefits to a firm from differentiating its products from those of its competitors and the desire 
to produce a product that is attractive to a large consumer base.
6 We show that this same tension arises in 
firms’ disclosure decisions about the quality of these products. While we assume that the attributes of 
products are exogenously given, we show that the nature of firms’ disclosure decisions about the quality 
of their product is very similar to firms’ decisions about optimal product differentiation when some or all 
attributes are endogenously chosen. 
  The paper most closely related to ours is Board (2009), which considers a duopoly model with an 
outside option. In Board’s model, a firm also needs to balance the incentives to alleviate competition with 
its higher-quality rivals and the outside option, which has the utility of zero. This feature implies that the 
profit function of the lower-quality firm is non-monotonic in its quality. Our model differs from Board’s 
in that we provide an alternative mechanism to underlay this non-monotonicity in the firm’s profit func-
tion. We focus on the head-to-head rivalry of the duopoly and do not depend on the existence of an out-
side option. We do so by allowing consumers to have heterogeneous tastes for not only over quality but 
also over location, i.e., we allow for horizontal as well as vertical product differentiation.
7 Allowing for 
both of these dimensions and heterogeneity in consumer tastes over them is important for several reasons. 
First, our approach embeds the assessment of disclosure incentives within the broader literature on prod-
                                                      
6 See Tirole (1994, Chapter 7) for an overview of the product differentiation literature. Most studies consider firms’ 
differentiation decisions for products that are horizontally or vertically differentiated. See Hotelling (1929), 
d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979), and Neven (1985) for the former case and Mussa and Rosen (1978) 
and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) for the latter case. In a paper most closely related to our model, Neven and 
Thisse (1990) examine firms’ differentiation decisions for products that have both horizontal and vertical dimen-
sions. 
7 Levin, Peck, and Ye (2005) have a similar mechanism in their model, but quality unraveling does not break down 
with disclosure cost and they focus on welfare analysis of costly disclosure under alternative market structures.   5 
uct differentiation, where products are viewed as bundles of multiple characteristics.
8 Second, allowing 
firms’ disclosure incentives to depend on the distribution of consumers’ preferences over both the hori-
zontal and vertical attributes of products provides potentially verifiable conditions for when, in the ab-
sence of regulation, less-than-complete disclosure can occur and, thus, provides more explicit and positive 
guidance for those situations in which mandatory product disclosure may be needed to reduce anti-
competitive firm behavior. 
The results of this paper also are related to the literature on informative advertising. For example, 
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) consider the strategic effect of firms using advertising to provide truthful 
information about their location. They note that firms in an oligopoly setting may actually benefit from 
higher advertising costs and may even seek to raise such costs themselves. This is because higher adver-
tising costs can reduce the amount of advertising done in a market and leave consumers with less infor-
mation to act upon when making their product choices. Less informed consumers will be less sensitive to 
prices across products and, as a result, firms can raise prices and achieve higher profits. It has sometimes 
been argued that this benefit of making advertising more costly is what has motivated professional or-
ganizations, such as the American Medical Association or the American Bar Association, to seek limita-
tions on the amount of advertising done by its membership (Peters, 1984). This incentive for strategic ad-
vertising is similar to the one that we argue may discourage firms from voluntarily disclosing the quality 
of their products.
9 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a duopoly model in 
which firms strategically choose to disclose the quality attribute of their products. In section 3, we provide 
an intuitive explanation of how the disclosure of the quality of products can affect demand elasticities and 
lead to more intense price competition among competing firms in a market. Section 4 offers concluding 
                                                      
8 The work of Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966), Muth (1966), Rosen (1974), and Gorman (1980) views all goods 
and services as bundles of characteristics. Tastes are plausibly heterogeneous over these attributes and, thus, over the 
bundles. These two features—products viewed as bundles of characteristics and consumer heterogeneity—are the 
key elements of the literature on product differentiation and hedonic pricing. 
9 Anderson and Renault (2006) offer an interesting comparison, in which they study firms’ strategic choices of dis-
closing horizontal attributes while the vertical attributes are known. The essence of their work is also that the prod-  6 
remarks. Longer proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
2.  Model 
2.1  Set Up 
We consider a duopoly model in which two firms sell products with two attributes. Each firm, firm A and 
firm B, is endowed with a product Yj, where j = A, B. These products differ across firms in their horizontal 
attribute, location (denoted by L),
10 and in their vertical attribute, the quality of their product (denoted by 
Q), so that Yj = (Lj, Qj). We assume that these attributes are exogenously given and cannot be altered and 
that firms produce their products with zero production costs.
11 With respect to the vertical attribute, either 
firm can produce a high-quality product (qh), or a low-quality one (ql), but not both. We denote the differ-
ence between these two types of product qualities by  where  = qh  ql > 0. Both firms are assumed to 
produce qh or ql with equal probabilities. 
  With respect to the horizontal attribute, firms are located vis-à-vis consumers at the end points of 
a Linear City, displayed in Figure 1. Let Lj denote the location of firm j in the linear city. Firm A’s loca-
tion is fixed at LA = 0 and firm B’s at LB = 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the Linear City in 
Figure 1, where Xi (0  Xi  1) denotes the i
th consumer’s location; thus, consumers differ with respect to 
their proximity to the two firms. We denote the distance of the i
th consumer from the j
th product as Dij = 
|Lj  Xi|. 
 
Figure 1: The Linear City 
  Following the standard formulation of the discrete choice model in the context of differentiated 
                                                                                                                                                                           
uct differentiation incentives in a multi-attribute product space may block complete voluntary disclosure. 
10 Herein, location represents the horizontal attribute of a product. Horizontal attributes are those for which consum-
ers have different preferences at the same prices, e.g., the color of an automobile. 
11 We make this assumption so that consumer beliefs do not vary with prices: prices do not depend on the value of 
any undisclosed quality and profit maximizing prices have no signaling roles. Daughety and Reingamum (2008) dis-
cuss disclosure through a credible agency and signaling via producer actions in a unified model. 
i X   0 1 
Firm B: YB = Y(LB = 1, QB = qh or ql)  Firm A: YA = Y(LA = 0, QA = qh or ql)  7 
products,
12 we assume that consumers face a set of three mutually exhaustive alternatives from which 
they must choose: product YA, product YB, and an outside alternative, Y0. In evaluating the “genuine” 
products – products A and B – consumers consider a product’s price, Pj; the transportation costs, Dij, 
where   is the per-unit distance cost to consumers;
13 and the consumer’s perception of its quality, 
() ( )   jj EQ E Q , i.e., the consumers’ expectation of the quality of product j, conditional on the infor-
mation, Ω, about the quality of products in the market that is disclosed to them by either seller. 
We allow heterogeneity in consumer preferences with respect to a product’s vertical attribute. In 
particular, we assume there are two types of consumers – “quality-satisficers” and “quality-lovers” – that 
differ in their valuation of a product’s amount of expected quality.
14 The i
th consumer, depending on her 
type, derives expected utility
15 from product j (j=A or B) according to the following utility functions: 
For quality-satisficers:      0 ,( ) , ( )      ij ij j j j a ij j UD EQP V I EQ q D P   (1) 
For quality-lovers:        0 ,( ) , ( ) ( )       ij ij j j j l j a ij j UD EQP EQ q I EQ q D P    (2) 
Note   . I  is an indicator function to capture a “quality assurance” effect once the expected quality is 
above a certain threshold. In the above specification, consumers’ preferences over the quality of a product 
consist of two components. First, quality-satisficers receive at least a fixed amount of utility, V, for pur-
chasing a product at any quality level. And, since we assume V < , the willingness of quality-satisficers 
to participate in the market is bounded, so that some or all of this type of consumers will opt out of the 
market if firms charge too high a price for their products. In contrast, quality-lovers receive no utility 
from a low-quality product but a utility equal to    ()   j l E Qq   for a product with quality above ql. 
                                                      
12 See Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (2001) for a summary of these models. 
13 In essence,  measures the spread of consumer heterogeneity over the horizontal attribute. The greater the value of 
, the harder it is for consumers to travel from one end of the city to the other. 
14 Satisficing is a word coined by Herbert Simon (1957), referring a decision-making strategy that attempts to meet 
criteria for adequacy. 
15 We evaluate utilities of consumers when they make their (possibly uninformed) decisions so all “utilities” we re-
fer to are expected utilities.    8 
Thus, the utility of quality-lovers is monotonically increasing in the expected quality of a product. Sec-
ond, all consumers, quality-satisficers and quality-lovers, receive a boost in utility, 0, from purchasing a 
product which has a perceived quality higher than or equal to qa, where    ,( ) 2  al h l qq q q . We assume 
that 0  2.
16 This feature of the utility functions ensures that firm A and B engage in direct competition 
with each other in the markets for both quality-satisficers and quality-lovers when the expected qualities 
of both products are sufficiently high. 
To summarize, both types of consumers – quality-satisficers and quality-lovers – care about 
whether the perceived quality of a product is above a certain level, although we assume that there are lim-
its to how much utility quality-satisficers get out of consuming quality, while quality-lovers continue to 
value incremental quality above this threshold. For example, “satisficed” restaurant patrons, while not 
preoccupied with the hygiene used in the preparation of their food, still get utility from knowing that the 
restaurant of their choice is sufficiently sanitary so as to minimize their risk of getting food poisoning. In 
contrast, the utility of quality-loving restaurant patrons continues to rise as a restaurant practices more and 
more stringent hygiene in its preparation of meals. 
Finally, we assume that the outside alternative is available to consumers with zero price and no 
transportation costs, and we normalize the utility associated with this outside alternative to 0, i.e. UiO  0. 
Consumers’ purchase decisions depend on a comparison of the utility from participating in the market and 
that from the outside option. The presence of the outside alternative implies that some or all consumers 
may “opt out” of the market for YA or YB if consuming either of these products would produce negative 
utility or, conversely, that a consumer will purchase product j only if 
    ,( ) , 0   ij ij j j UD EQP , j = A, B. (3)   
Assuming the market participation constraint in (3) is the standard way for creating some discipline on the 
                                                      
16 It can be easily shown that when both products are perceived to be of quality greater than qa, the assumption 0  
2 ensures that the marginal consumer who is indifferent between choosing product A or B will receive a utility 
greater than 0. Tirole (1994), in discussing spatial competition (Chapter 7.1), makes a similar assumption to ensure 
that consumers’ surplus from the goods is sufficiently large to induce the two firms to engage in direct competition.   9 
pricing and quality-disclosing decisions of sellers. In essence, the possibility that consumers can either 
purchase or produce other goods is a natural way to avoid the situation of consumers being “captive” to 
certain markets, i.e., being forced to purchase one product or the other. Allowing for an outside option 
creates a potential (or actual) “punishment” to firms for disclosing that their products are low quality. For 
algebraic simplicity, we restrict consumer preferences so that the low-quality product provides a level of 
utility at or below that for the outside option for quality-lovers.
17 Consider, for example, the market for 
child care.
18 A feature of such markets is the heterogeneity in the quality of market-based child care cen-
ters that parents might use. A key alternative to market-based forms of care is the outside option of par-
ents, themselves, providing for the care of their children. Parents do elect to care for their children instead 
of using low-quality child care centers and, consistent with our model, this decision is often affected by 
such factors as the costs of transporting their children to and from such centers. 
    Consumer heterogeneity is characterized by the joint distribution of consumers’ locations and 
tastes for product quality, Pr(Xi,i). At the extreme, the distribution of consumers’ locations and tastes for 
quality may be uncorrelated, i.e., Pr(Xi,i) = Pr(Xi)Pr(i). Alternatively, the distribution of consumers’ lo-
cations and tastes for quality may be correlated. To characterize this joint distribution, we assume that 
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where the parameter, , measures the degree of correlation in consumer preferences over the horizontal 
                                                      
17 The assumption   ,( ) 2  al h l qq q q  greatly simplifies algebra in deriving Proposition 1 presented below. It 
does, however, rule out the possibility that quality lovers receive less utility from the outside option than from the 
low-quality product, ql. While we do not formally prove that incomplete disclosure can occur in the latter situation, 
it is clear that the seller of a low-quality product can lose market share to the outside option in the lovers market by 
disclosing the quality of its product. This is because some quality lovers – in particular, those who reside further 
from the firm selling the low-quality product – may choose the outside option over the low-quality product as a re-
sult of this disclosure. That is, a firm selling a low-quality product will still be “punished” by disclosure in much the 
same way as in the model that maintains the above restriction. 
18 See Currie and Blau (2006) for a discussion of this market and the role that quality heterogeneity plays in parental 
child care decisions.  10
and vertical attributes and we assume that   [0,1].
19 Consider the following two extreme cases: 
Case I:   
11
0P r 0 a n d P r
22
     ii ii XX     
Case II:     1P r 0 1 a n d P r      ii i ii i X XX X    
In Case I, consumers’ locations and tastes for quality are uncorrelated, so that quality-satisficers and qual-
ity-lovers are equally likely to be located at any point along the Linear City. In Case II, however, quality-
lovers are more likely to live close to firm B (located at LB = 1), while quality-satisficers are more likely 
to live close to firm A (located at LA = 0). Case II, for example, characterizes the situation where firm B is 
located in the upscale suburb of a city where consumers have a greater appreciation for quality than do 
residents who reside in the inner city close to firm A.
20 As  increases from 0 to 1, the two groups of con-
sumers become further geographically segregated with respect to their tastes. That is,  characterizes the 
degree of consumer segregation with respect to the horizontal and vertical attributes. 
  To complete the setup, we need to characterize what consumers and firms know and do not know 
about the product attributes and the distribution of consumer locations and tastes for quality. We assume 
all consumers know their own preferences over quality, their own locations, and the locations of firms. 
Furthermore, consumers know the values of the parameters 0, , , , and . As a result, consumers 
know how they are distributed with respect to their tastes for quality, i.e., they know the conditional prob-
abilities in (4) and (5). Consumers are assumed not to know, a priori, the quality of either firm’s product, 
at least not without any disclosure. However, they do know the distribution of quality levels in the mar-
ket.
21 With this information, consumers can form an ex-ante expectation about the undisclosed quality of 
each product, that is, EΩ=Æ(QA) = EΩ=Æ(QB) = (qh + ql)/2. If firms provide consumers with any additional 
                                                      
19 Note that all of our results go through if we allow for the possibility that   [-1, 1]. This is because the two firms 
are identical ex-ante so that by simply reversing the locations of the two firms in Figure 1 we cover the case where 
1    0. In an earlier working paper version (Hotz and Xiao, 2002), in which we have a low-quality firm and a 
high-quality one, we allow   [-1, 1] to allow the relationship between X and θ to vary from negative to positive.  
20 This segregation can be a result of buyer-seller sorting, something which is not considered in this paper. 
21 That is, consumers know that four possible combinations of quality across the two firms can be offered, i.e., (QA = 
qh, QB = ql), (QA = ql, QB = ql), (QA = ql, QB = qh), and (QA = qh, QB = qh), and, given their knowledge of the prob- 11
information about product quality, consumers will update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule. Finally, we as-
sume that firms, besides having all of the information consumers possess, know the quality of their own 
products and that of their rivals. We make the latter assumption for two reasons. First, in many industries, 
firms do hire expert services and/or use superior technology to test rival products in order to learn about 
their quality and the incentives for firms to acquire such information about their rivals may exceed that of 
individual consumers. Second, and more important, we maintain this assumption to focus our model on 
the role that differential information between sellers and consumers, rather than among sellers, plays in 
disclosure decisions.
22 
2.2  Disclosure Technology and Game Structure 
We assume that there exists a truthful and costless disclosure mechanism for sellers to disclose the quality 
dimension of their products. For example, there may be a non-profit certification agency offering free 
services to firms seeking disclosure.
23 For example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pro-
vides what amounts to certification, free of charge, of certain products ranging from bottled water to 
manufacturers of clinical diagnostic products that measure total cholesterol. Similarly, Good Housekeep-
ing magazine will provide and publicize its Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval for products it deems to 
be of high quality. In our model, either firm can use this mechanism to credibly convey to consumers the 
quality of its product no matter whether it produces a high- or low-quality product. 
  To characterize the timing of firm decisions, we adopt a two-stage dynamic game. In the first 
stage, firms decide on disclosure simultaneously. In the second stage, firms engage in Bertrand competi-
tion to maximize profits and consumers choose which product to purchase to maximize utility. Consum-
ers’ valuations of products are conditional on product prices and what they have inferred about the quality 
of these products from what firms have disclosed about their products. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
abilities, they know the probabilities with which these combinations can occur. 
22 For a literature on information-sharing among oligopolists, see Gal-Or (1985, 1986), in which rival firms have 
private information and use it against one another. 
23 Lizzeri (1999) discusses the strategic manipulation of information by certification intermediaries and shows that a 
monopoly certification intermediary does not have full incentives to reveal all information. We assume away this  12
  The essence of this two-stage game is that each firm makes its first-stage disclosure decisions, 
considering the resulting consumers’ beliefs about product qualities and price competition between firms 
in the second stage. We solve for a subgame-perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which consists of firms’ 
equilibrium disclosure and pricing strategies, and consumers’ equilibrium purchasing decisions and be-
liefs about product qualities. Specifically, in the first stage each firm evaluates its payoff (profit) in the 
second stage under various information scenarios, which are determined by its own disclosure decisions 
and that of its rival. Then the firm chooses the optimal first-stage strategy that yields the best final payoff 
given consumers’ beliefs and its rival’s first-stage and second-stage responses. Consumers update their 
beliefs about firms’ qualities using Bayes’ rule after observing firms’ disclosure decisions and then make 
purchasing decisions. 
In section 2.3, we solve for the second stage outcomes. In section 2.4, we develop propositions 
regarding firms’ prices and profits given firms’ disclosure decisions and consumers’ beliefs. In section 
2.5, we solve the model and specify a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We establish that firm B has a domi-
nant equilibrium disclosure strategy. However, firm A’s equilibrium disclosure strategy critically hinges 
on the nature of consumer heterogeneity, i.e., on the values of , , , and . 
2.3  The Second-stage Outcomes Given Consumers’ Beliefs 
We solve the second stage outcomes given firms’ first stage disclosure decisions and consumers’ beliefs 
about qualities of the two products. Recall that  = qh  ql, i.e.,  denotes the real difference between the 
high- and low-quality products. We also define     EΩ(QB) – EΩ(QA) as consumers’ perceived difference 
in quality between the two products, given the disclosure regime, Ω, where the range for    is [,], 
since either firm can produce a high-quality or low-quality product with equal probability. 
  To derive the demand functions for firms’ products, we need to consider consumers’ choices 
among three alternatives: purchase YA, purchase YB, or purchase neither and resort to the outside option. 
For consumer i to participate in the market for product A or B instead of choosing the outside option, the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
strategic effect and focus on firms’ incentives to use a truthful and non-strategic certification mechanism.  13
previously-defined market condition on her utility given in participation constraint in (3) must hold for 
one of these products. Whether this participation constraint is satisfied for some or all consumers depends 
on consumers’ perception of product quality. There are three potential situations can arise, depending on 
consumers’ perceptions of the quality of these products. The first situation arises when either or both 
products are perceived by consumers to be of quality ql. Given the availability of the outside option, no 
quality-lovers will be willing to purchase a product revealed to be of quality ql and the firm selling it will 
generate all its profit from the quality-satisficers’ market. Note that if one product is perceived to be of 
quality ql while the rival product is perceived to be of a quality higher than ql, the rival firm will enjoy a 
monopoly profit in the quality-lovers’ market. The second situation arises when either or both products 
are perceived to be of quality greater than ql to draw a positive number of consumers into both markets 
but not high enough so that the two firms need not directly compete with each other in one or both con-
sumer markets. Finally, the third situation occurs when the perceived qualities of both products are suffi-
ciently high so that the market participation condition in (3) holds for all consumers. As a result, the two 
firms always engage in head-to-head competition. Since the third situation captures the essence of strate-
gic interaction by firms trying to balance tradeoffs in two segmented consumer markets, we start from 
solving the pricing equilibrium conditioning on    in this scenario, and then work our way back to see 
what will happen when perceived qualities are lower and firms may not directly compete with each other 
in one or both of the consumer markets. 
  If the two firms directly compete with each other in the markets for both quality-satisficers and 
quality-lovers, the purchase decisions of the two types of consumers can be characterized as follows: 





 and firm B’s product YB = Y(1, QB) if and only if Xi > 
2
  BA PP

. 
  If a consumer is a quality-lover, she will purchase YA if and only if Xi  
2
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BA PP 

 and YB if  14
and only if Xi > 
2




These purchase decisions are illustrated in Figure 2. In the figure, the horizontal axis represents the loca-
tion of consumers, while the vertical axis represents the probability that a quality-lover lives at location X. 
The positively-sloped line in the figure divides the (X, Pr()) space into two areas: area C1 + C4, which 
characterizes the “location regions” for quality-lovers, and area C2 + C3, which characterizes the corre-
sponding regions for quality-satisficers. This figure illustrates the situation in which a larger mass of qual-
























We denote area C1 + C2 by sA, which is the proportion of consumers buying product YA, i.e., the 
market share for product YA and area C3 + C4 by sB, which is the market share for product YB. Algebrai-
cally, these market shares are given by: 
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The profit functions are given by: 2
24 
   AA A Ps   (8) 
   B BB Ps   (9) 
To ensure that there are maximal values of profit functions, that prices are strategically complementary, 
and that there is a unique and stable price equilibrium, we assume that  < . This assumption ensures 
that the profit functions are well defined. The following first-order conditions characterize the firms’ 
profit maximizing problems: 
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The conditions in (10) and (11) imply the following best-response functions: 
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. The equilibrium prices for the two products are given by:  16
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It follows from (14) and (15) that: 
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The equilibrium profits of the two firms are: 
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2.4  Firms’ Prices and Profits as Functions of    
The following propositions characterize how each firm’s prices and profits depend on consumers’ per-
ceived quality of products YA and YB. 
PROPOSITION 1: 
1) If product j (j=A or B) is perceived to be of low quality (ql), firm j will earn a profit smaller than /2. 
2) If either firm becomes a local monopoly in one or both of the consumer markets, its total profit will be 
an increasing function of its perceived quality. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
PROPOSITION 2: If the two firms engage in direct competition in the markets for both types of consumers, 
firm B’s equilibrium price and profit in the second stage are strictly increasing functions of   . 
                                                                                                                                                                           
24 Note that there are no production costs. 
25 Given this equilibrium price difference and our assumption  < , one can verify that there is full coverage in 
both the quality-satisficers’ and quality-lovers’ market.  17
Proof: When firms A and B directly compete with each other in both consumer markets, consider how 
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 > 0 because  > 0,  > 0,   0, and 2       > 0. The last inequality holds because 0 
   1,  < , and       . 
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We can show 
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 > 0, 
*
B s  > 0, 
*
B P  > 0,  > 0,  > 0, and         0.  Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION 3: If product YB is perceived to be of high quality (qh), there exists a cutoff value 
*  
(0,1), such that when  > 
*, firm A’s equilibrium price in the second stage is higher if the perceived 
quality of its product is the average quality, (qh + ql)/2, than if the quality of its product is perceived to be 
of high quality (qh). 
Proof: When product A is perceived to be of high quality (qh), firm A will charge a price of  
h q
A P  . 
When product A is perceived to be of average quality, (qh + ql)/2, firm A will charge a price of 
a q
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 because 0      .  Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION 4: If product YB is perceived to be of high quality (qh), there exists a cutoff value 
**  
(0,1), such that when  > 
**, firm A’s equilibrium profit in the second stage is higher if the perceived 
quality of its product is the average quality, (qh + ql)/2, than if the quality of it’s product is perceived to be 
of high quality (qh). 
Proof: When product A is perceived to be of high quality (qh), firm A will receive a profit of  2 
h q
A   . 
When product A is perceived to be of average quality, (qh + ql)/2, firm A will receive a profit of 
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, there must exist a 
**  (0,1), such that when  > 
** ,  2 
a q
A  .   Q.E.D. 
  The above propositions characterize how the firms’ prices and profits vary as a function of what 
consumers perceive about the quality of their products. Propositions 3 and 4, in particular, establish that if 
the degree of correlation between consumer preferences and locations, , is sufficiently high and one of 
the firm has a high quality product, then the equilibrium profit and price of the other product will be 
higher when it is perceived quality equals the average relative to if it is perceived as being a high quality 
product. As  approaches 1 and consumers are more geographically similar in their tastes, anything that 
reduces the differentiation between the two products will result in more intense price competition and, in  19
turn, cause the prices and profits of firm A to fall. To better understand these properties, consider how the 
firms’ best-response functions in a fully-covered market vary with the degree to which consumers are 
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In the general case, the best-response functions are a weighted average of those given in (18)  (21): 
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 and   [0,1].
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  Figure 3 illustrates the above decomposition of firms’ best-response functions when     0, that 
is, when consumers perceive that the quality of product YB is higher than or equal to that of product YA.
27 
In this figure, the intersection of 
BR
A P  and 
BR
B P  is the price equilibrium. The decomposition shows that all 
points along the bold line LH can be supported as an equilibrium, given that   [0, 1].
28 Which equilib-
                                                      

















 < 0. When  = 0,  = 1 and when  = 1,  = 0. Therefore,   [0,1]. 
27 The intuition conveyed by Figure 3 is similar to that for the results in Corts (1998), who investigates how price 
discrimination may lead to an all-worse-off result for firms ranking consumer groups differently. 
28 We have established that 
**  B A PP  =  3    . It follows that all price equilibria form a straight line that is independ-
ent of . Any point on this line is a weighted average of two end points.  20
rium will be realized depends on . If, for example,  = 1 (corresponding to  = 0), the equilibrium will 
be at point H (the northeast corner of line LH). If  = 0 (corresponding to  = 1), the equilibrium will be 
at point L (the southwest corner of line LH). 
 Point  M in Figure 3 is the intersection of best response functions and the price equilibrium where 
consumers perceive the two products to be of the same quality, i.e.,    = 0. When consumers perceive that 
product YB is of higher quality than YA, the best response function of firm B will always shift upward. The 
magnitude of this upward shift depends on , , , and   . The larger is , the greater is the magnitude of 
the shift. At the same time, firm A’s best response function first shifts downward and then shifts upward 
as  reaches a certain threshold. As shown in the figure, the region close to point H on line LH corre-
sponds to the situation where not only firm B, but also firm A, is able to charge a higher price when prod-
uct YB is perceived to be of higher quality than is product YA. Suppose consumers already perceive product 
YB as a high-quality product. When  is sufficiently large so as to be close to point H on line LH in Figure 
3, both firms would have to lower their prices if product YA is perceived to be a high-quality, rather than a 
low-quality, product. How would this price competition affect firm A’s disclosure incentive? Section 2.5 




















Figure 3: Price Equilibria 
2.5  A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of Incomplete Disclosure 
We now establish the main result of the paper concerning when partial disclosure occurs. 
PROPOSITION 5: There exists a cutoff value for , 
**  (0,1), such that if  > 
**, information disclosure 
is incomplete in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the duopoly game. In this equilibrium: 
1)  Firm B always discloses its quality if it produces a high-quality product. If firm B does not disclose 
the quality of its product, consumers correctly infer that it produces a low-quality product. 
2)  If firm B produces (and discloses) a high-quality product, firm A always chooses not to disclose the 
quality of its product, even if it produces a high-quality product. Only if firm B produces a low-
quality product will firm A choose to disclose that the quality of its product is high. 
3)  If firm B produces (and discloses) a high-quality product, consumers will maintain their perception of 
the quality of product YA as EΩ=Æ(QA) = (qh + ql)/2 and perceive the quality difference between the two 
products to 
*    = EΩ=Æ(QB) – EΩ=Æ(QA) = Δ/2. If firm B produces a low-quality product, consumers 




















Price equilibrium when  0     22
4)  The equilibrium prices are given by (14) and (15), and the equilibrium profits are given by (16) and 
(17), with 
*    substituted in for   . 
 
Proof: We consider each of the components of Proposition 5 in turn. 
1)  Propositions 1 and 2 has established: a) firm B’s profit is an increasing function of its expected qual-
ity if it does not engage in direct competition with firm A in both markets; c) firm B’s equilibrium 
profit function in the second stage is strictly increasing in    when firm A and B are engaging in di-
rect competition in both consumer markets. By disclosing its product to be of high quality, firm B can 
maximize consumers’ perception of its product quality E(QB) and thus   . So firm B’s dominant 
strategy, if it produces a high-quality product, is disclosure. It is straightforward to establish that con-
sumers associate low quality with undisclosed product YB because firm B has a dominant strategy to 
disclose its high quality. 
2)  There are two cases to consider with respect to firm A’s disclosure decision: 
a)  If firm B produces (and discloses) a high-quality product, firm A will earn a profit less than /2 if 
it is perceived to produce low quality (ql) (established in Proposition 1) and a profit equal to /2 if 
it is perceived to produce high quality (qh) (established by equation (15) with    = 0). Proposition 
4 establishes that when  > 
** (0,1), firm A’s second-stage equilibrium profit is higher if it is 
perceived to produce a product of average quality, (qh + ql)/2, rather than one that is high-quality 
(qh). As a result, if firm B produces (and discloses) a high-quality product, firm A will not reveal 
the quality of its product, regardless of whether it is high- or low-quality whenever  > 
**  
(0,1). 
b)  If firm B produces (and is correctly perceived as producing) a low-quality product and firm A 
produces a high-quality product, firm A will receive a monopoly profit in the quality-lovers’ mar-
ket. Proposition 1 establishes that firm A’s profit is increasing in E(QA). Therefore, firm A will 
choose disclosure if it produces a high-quality product. 
3)  Consumers update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule based on what either firm does (or does not) dis- 23
close about the quality of its product. Consumers associate low quality with undisclosed product YA 
because firm A’s dominant strategy is disclose its high quality if YB is a low-quality product. How-
ever, if firm B produces a high-quality product (and discloses that it is so), consumers gain no new in-
formation about product YA because firm A will not choose to disclose the quality of its product, re-
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which implies that consumers will maintain their priors about the undisclosed quality of product YA. 
4)  With consumers’ beliefs as specified in 3), neither firm will want to deviate from their strategies 
specified in 1) and 2). It is then straightforward to calculate the equilibrium prices and profits. 
The above logic establishes that a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium exists as either firm has its dominant 
disclosure and pricing strategy for a given set of parameter values and for consumers’ Bayesian-updated 
beliefs. Under conditions specified in this proposition, information disclosure is incomplete in that firm A 
will always choose not to disclose the quality of its product if firm B produces and discloses that it’s 
product is of high quality.  Q.E.D. 
 
  Proposition 5 makes clear that firms’ disclosure incentives, as well as market outcomes under dif-
ferent information scenarios, critically hinges on consumer preferences and their distribution of consumer 
preferences over the two attributes of products, i.e., on the values of , , , and . It establishes that 
when  < 
**, the unraveling result of Grossman and Milgrom holds, as either firm with a high-quality 
product will find it in their interest to disclose this fact. This can be seen in the limiting when  = 0 and 
consumers’ locations and tastes for quality are uncorrelated where non-disclosure allows either firm to 
improve their profits by non-disclosure. On the other hand, when  > 
**, the unraveling process breaks  24
down as firm A has no incentive to disclose its quality when firm B is perceived as producing a high qual-
ity product. 
The equilibrium established in the above proposition is not unique. For example, if consumers be-
lieve that undisclosed quality is definitely the low quality, then firm A has to disclose that its product is 
high quality for all values of  to avoid losing all consumers and consumers’ beliefs are therefore correct. 
In such an equilibrium, information disclosure is complete. However, the force of the proposition is to 
show that the unraveling process may break down under certain circumstances, i.e., that an incomplete-
disclosure equilibrium exists. Even without uniqueness of the equilibrium, the basic point remains that a 
firm with a low quality product may choose not to disclose its quality in order to alleviate competition 
with the outside option and that a firm with a high quality product also may choose not to disclose their 
quality in order to alleviate competition with the other high-quality firm. Put differently, Proposition 5 es-
tablishes that in the presence of products with multiple attributes and with consumers that have heteroge-
neous preferences over these attributes, an equilibrium exists in which voluntary disclosure of product 
quality by both sellers in the market will not be complete. Conceding that our equilibrium is not unique 
does not detract from what this paper established. Yes, there may be other equilibria in which voluntary 
disclosure occurs. But, our paper does establish that there exists an equilibrium in which it does not occur 
and we characterize, in part, some circumstances in which that is the case. 
3.  Intuition and Extension 
As established in our model, the amount of information consumers have about the attributes of differenti-
ated products affects their purchase decisions. Full information allows consumers to better assess the en-
tire bundle of attributes contained in each product. However, allowing consumers to make such assess-
ment, under certain circumstances, need not be in the best interest of firms. More information may change 
the substitutability of products and make consumers more sensitive to the prices charged by firms, which 
firms want to avoid. In this section, we provide intuition about the possibility of incomplete disclosure 
equilibrium by relating firms’ strategic disclosure decisions to how disclosure can change the elasticities  25
of demand for multi-attribute products. 
3.1  Product Substitution Patterns and Demand Elasticities 
Our results indicate that whether complete disclosure increases the price responsiveness of consumers for 
a product depends on how consumers’ tastes for quality and their locations vis-à-vis firms are jointly dis-
tributed. To develop this relationship, we need to characterize the elasticities of demand for products YA 
and YB. Consider first the demand elasticities for the two products under consumer beliefs   . When mar-
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 < 0. (See the Appendix for a proof.) We also 




 < 0, when  is above a threshold in the range of 
(0,1). (Again, see the Appendix.) It follows that when  is large enough, price elasticities will increase for 
both firms as    decreases. Higher demand elasticities imply a greater degree of substitutability among 
products, which results in more intensive price competition among firms. As we have noted above, reve-
lation of an attribute of a product to consumers that causes    to decrease will result in a decrease in 
prices and profits for both firms. As Proposition 5 establishes, a firm (in this case, firm A) will tend to  26
find it in its interest to not disclose the unobserved attribute of its product in order to avoid inducing a re-
duction in   , the perceived difference in the quality of the competing products. To do otherwise would 
induce greater price competition with its rival and, in the end, reduce its profits. 
  To reiterate our points on the difference between our work and Board (2009) in the introduction, 
we now show that our model is able to capture firms’ incentives to strategically disclose information 
based the interaction between consumers’ preferences over two different product dimensions. Note that as 
 gets larger, consumers become more geographically segregated with respect to their tastes for quality. 
As a result, the “home” market for firm B is mostly made up of quality-lovers, while the home market for 
firm A consists of mostly quality-satisficers. Neither firm wants to disclose too low a quality for the fear 
to losing too much market share. However, if the market is fully covered and product YB is perceived to 
be of higher quality than product YA, firms are properly “matched” to their home markets. Any effort to 
eliminate the perceived quality difference will upset this match and increase product substitutability. Firm 
B will lose its dominance over quality-lovers while firm A will lose out with quality-satisficers. Both 
firms will have to lower prices in order to win consumers back. In turn, firms may be reluctant to reveal 
too much information. 
As is well known from the literature on optimal product differentiation, firms have strategic in-
centives to differentiate their products to reduce demand elasticities and alleviate price competition with 
rivals selling otherwise similar products. When the unobserved quality is the single dimension of product 
differentiation, disclosing information on product quality can precisely achieve the effect of differentiat-
ing a firm’s own product away from that of its competitor. However, this is not true when there already 
exists another product attribute. In our model, from the perspective of consumers, both products are al-
ready fully differentiated by their locations, as the two firms are located at opposite ends of the Linear 
City. Even with no information about product quality, each firm already faces a downward sloping de-
mand curve. Consumers do not view the two products as perfect substitutes and firms selling such differ-
entiated products earn positive profits. With the existing horizontal differentiation, a firm’s incentive to  27
differentiate its product along another dimension via disclosure is not obvious and is strategically driven. 
Nothing concerning firms’ proprietary information can be so readily “unraveling”: a firm producing a 
product with a high-quality attribute may or may not reveal this attribute, depending on whether the reve-
lation gives it the necessary “niche.” 
3.2  Discussion: Extension to N Firms 
So far we have considered a duopoly model. How would this model be generalized to an N-firm case? We 
think that consumer heterogeneity combined with multi-attribute products can still result in less than 
complete disclosure of product quality. In a one-dimensional product attribute model, firms disclose their 
true quality level to achieve product differentiation. However, such disclosure may not be necessary if 
such differentiation already exists. Let’s consider a Hotelling Linear City model with N firms: 
 
 
Suppose that in equilibrium all firms choose to disclose their true quality levels. Would any firm, say firm 
1, have an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium, given the disclosure decisions of the other N-1 
firms? For firm 1, the answer appears to hinge on the distribution of consumers’ multi-dimensional pref-
erences between products 1 and 2, which are the closest substitutes in the absence of any information 
about product quality. For example, if, in the absence of any disclosures, firm 2’s “captive” clientele is 
mostly to be quality-lovers and if firm 2 discloses its product to be of high quality, then firm 1 may not 
choose to disclose its true quality level based on exactly the same logic as established in our simpler 
model. Therefore, it is not a Nash Equilibrium for all firms to disclose their qualities and, as a result, in-
formation will not be complete in this N-firm case. By the same token, firm 2’s disclosure decision de-
pends on the distribution of consumers’ preferences between products 1 and 2 as well as between prod-
ucts 2 and 3. While solving for the equilibrium in this case will be more difficult given that consumer het-
erogeneity with respect to preferences over quality is more complicated, it still appears that the unraveling 
of information about product qualities need not always occur in the N-firm case of our model. 
Firm 1  Firm N  Firm 3 to Firm N-1  Firm 2  28
4.  Conclusion 
Effective provision of information ensures the efficiency of market operations and benefits social welfare 
in a variety of ways. Laws and regulations that make disclosure of information about products is one way 
to insure that consumers have such information. If, however, the “unraveling result” of Grossman (1981) 
and Milgrom (1981) holds, mandatory disclosure is unnecessary since firms have sufficient incentives 
voluntarily to disclose the quality of their products, so long as disclosure is verifiable and has trivial costs. 
As a result, we should not expect to see any systematic change in disclosure behaviors, prices, and profits 
of firms when disclosure mechanisms—either from voluntary to mandatory or visa-versa—change. 
  The findings in this paper cast doubt on the above characterization of the potential for non-market 
forces to ensure disclosure about product quality. In particular, we have shown that the unraveling result 
of Grossman and Milgrom can break down when products have more than one attribute and there is het-
erogeneity in consumer tastes over these attributes. We are able to show that firms do not always have full 
incentives voluntarily to disclose information on product quality as providing more information to con-
sumers can cause more elastic demands and, thus, intensify price competition among firms. As a result, 
government intervention in the form of mandatory disclosure laws may change firm behavior and benefit 
consumers in markets with incomplete information. In fact, several recent empirical investigations of par-
ticular markets (Mathios, 2000; Jin and Leslie, 2003) has shown that mandatory disclosure laws do make 
a difference, indicating that firms selling differentiated products may gain financially from maintaining of 
“a culture of silence” with respect to the true quality of there products.
29 More accurately, we show that 
mandatory disclosure laws may reduce prices in certain product markets as the resulting disclosure of in-
formation intensifies price competition. In principle, this latter implication is testable by examining how 
prices for certain products change before and after a change in a disclosure regime, such as the imposition 
of a law mandating the disclosure of quality attributes of a product. 
                                                      
29 Jin and Leslie (2003) note: “One may wonder why restaurants did not disclose the results of their hygiene inspec-
tions prior to the grade cards. Why would a restaurant manager not create their own poster clearly showing their lat-
est hygiene score, say, and display it in the window? Perhaps this indicates it is unprofitable for restaurants to in-
crease the provision of hygiene quality information to consumers.”  29
  More importantly, we find that what happens to prices, profits, and consumer welfare under dif-
ferent information scenarios depends on the distribution of consumer preferences over all of the attributes 
of products. In effect, disclosure of product quality by some firms can exert an “externality” effect on 
their rivals which can benefit consumers but make firms worse off. Without non-market forces, such as 
governments mandating disclosure, firms may find that their self-interest does not align with voluntary 
disclosure and consumers may find they lack critical information about product quality. 
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Appendix 
A)  Proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof: 1) If EΩ (Qj) = ql, firm j will lose all quality-lovers and collect all its profit from the quality-
satisficers’ market. Therefore firm j’s market share is sj  1/2. The maximum price firm j can charge is V, 
otherwise it will lose all quality-satisficers to either the outside option or the other firm. Because V < , 
firm j’s profit will be less than /2 if it is revealed as producing a low-quality product. 
2) If one or both consumers markets are not fully covered by the two firms, either firm will become a 
local monopoly and do not directly compete with each other in the partially covered market. Either firm’s 
profit is increasing with its perceived quality because it can always charge the same price and attract a 
larger market share in the market where it serves as a local monopoly unless it has already taken the entire 
market. Even with a full market share where it serves as a local monopoly, the firm can do no worse in 
profit because it can always charge the same price and receive the same market share.    Q.E.D. 
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An Illustration of Our Model 
In this section, we illustrate how our results might play out with an example.
30 Suppose there are two res-
taurants in a market, one is a fast food outlet specializing in hamburgers and the other is a French restau-
rant featuring fancy dishes like escargot. Two types of consumers—students and professors—populate 
this market. At the same price for a meal, we suppose that, on average, students strongly prefer hamburg-
ers to French cuisine as eating fast food saves time for studying, while professors, who have more sophis-
ticated palates, have just the opposite tastes. Meanwhile, professors also have higher hygiene standards 
than do students.
31 
  Suppose the two restaurants may differ in their hygienic practices. Neither type of consumers, on 
their own, can readily determine the hygienic quality of the restaurants, although they have formed priors 
based on past experience. To reduce health risks, the local public health department inspects restaurants 
and rates their hygiene quality. Suppose that the department, based on its inspections, issues ratings of the 
hygiene quality to restaurants but that it is up to the restaurants as to whether they reveal to the general 
public their hygiene ratings. The inspections are unannounced and the inspectors rate the hygiene condi-
tions on the day of inspection. Since hygiene conditions can vary over time, a more sanitary kitchen can 
sometimes fail to obtain certification and a usually dirty kitchen can sometimes pass an inspection. 
Suppose, in fact, that the French restaurant maintains a very sanitary kitchen to cater to profes-
sors’ standards, while the fast food restaurant’s hygienic practices have larger variances. Let’s first con-
sider the case where both restaurants have a good day when inspected and receive high ratings. Let’s pre-
sume that the French restaurant, with professors as its “captive” clientele, will be happy to announce its 
high rating. However, burger-loving students do not place value on better hygienic practices, at which the 
fast food outlet currently seems to excel. Will the fast food outlet want to post its high ratings? 
                                                      
30 This example is inspired by Jin and Leslie (2003), who study the hygiene practices and sales volume of restau-
rants in Los Angeles County under alternative disclosure requirements concerning the findings of public health in-
spections. 
31 Professors, say, cannot afford to miss the classes they teach due to food poisoning while students do not mind 
missing a few of those classes, even if they have to spend the time in the student infirmary!  35
  Suppose the fast food restaurant does post its certificate. Naturally, some professors, who value 
French food less strongly than other professors, want to switch to the fast food outlet upon learning that it 
maintains more sanitary conditions. In response, the French restaurant may want to mark down the price it 
charges for a meal to lure back its consumer base. This move, however, will affect the fast food outlet’s 
market share, as some students, who value hamburgers less strongly than other students, will be willing to 
switch to the French restaurant for cheaper meals. In turn, the fast food outlet also may want to reduce the 
price of its hamburgers, which may induce further price-cutting by the French restaurant. As a result of 
this price competition, both restaurants would end up with lower prices and profits if the fast food outlet 
were to post its hygiene ratings. Thus disclosing its hygiene rating would not be in the fast food outlet’s 
self-interest. As a result, voluntary disclosure will not occur in this market, even though both professors 
and students may be better off by having information on hygiene quality—for different reasons—prior to 
deciding where to dine. 
  What is central to this example is that consumers value both the horizontal attribute (taste of food 
 or time saving) and a vertical attribute (hygiene quality) of the product (a meal outside the home) in a 
market in which buyer-seller sorting has resulted in a particular form of segregation of consumers. If con-
sumers know both attributes of the meals each restaurant is serving, they will choose to trade-off their 
preferred meals for more sanitary food and need to be compensated for meals which they enjoy less. Un-
der this configuration of consumer preferences, firms may not have an incentive to break the existing 
taste-segregation of consumers by disclosing information about one of the attributes of their meals. Dis-
closure may increase the substitutability between the two types of meals, intensify price competition, and 
lower profits for both restaurants. 